When it comes to elections and voting, there is some strange notion that Christians should keep their faith invisible and isolated the moment an election is called and when they enter the voting booth. I say ‘strange’ for two reasons. Firstly, it seems to be only Christians to whom this applies. Secondly, I at least am unsure how anyone could vote if they did not do so in line with what they believe and value. The debates, discussions and advertising leading up to a vote are all targeted at some part of our value system. This is true for all levels of government elections as well as for referenda.
In this post, I am going to argue that this expectation is absurd. I will do so from two different perspectives, one ‘internal’ and one ‘external.’ The internal case will be based on a paper by Alvin Plantinga, Advice to Christian Philosophers. The external case will be grounded in a paper by Jurgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere. Plantinga is a Christian, Habermas is an atheist.
Introduction
This is not a post about who anyone should be voting for or do I provide specifics on how anyone should be voting on any particular issue. I do think it is entirely appropriate for church leaders to recommend a way to vote to their congregation. All kinds of others do: political parties, news agencies and groups centred around this or that issue. However, if a church leader should even hint at a voting position, you would think a rogue state had just launched a nuclear warhead. It is important for Christians to remember that when leaders do speak of political matters, they are entitled to do so and be respected. However, what they say is not canonical; the congregation is not obliged to follow.
Advice from Alvin Plantinga
In 1983 Alvin Plantinga moved to the University of Notre Dame in the US. His inaugural address was published the following year as ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers.’ In it, he gives wide ranging advice on philosophical topics on which Christians should have an opinion. Christians are committed to ‘a broad but specific way of looking at humankind and the world and God” (1). He notes that among philosophy’s “most important and pressing projects are systematizing, deepening, exploring, articulating this perspective, and exploring its bearing on the rest of what we think and do” (2). Christians take their reference from the Scriptures, the creeds and the documents of the church; our opinions and views need to be clearly articulated and well thought out whatever they may be. If Plantinga’s advice is seen more generally, then it is easy to see it as being applicable in how believers approach any topic.
Plantinga suggests that
the Christian philosophical community has its own agenda; it need not and should not automatically take its projects from the list of those currently in favour at the leading contemporary centres of philosophy … [and] the Christian philosophical community has a right to its perspectives; it is under no obligation first to show that this perspective is plausible with respect to what is taken for granted by all philosophers, or most philosophers, or the leading philosophers of our day (3).
Plantinga does not mean we must completely isolate our questions and the thinking about them from the rest of the world. Rather we should not be driven by what is important to this or that discipline. He concludes:
In sum, we who are Christians and propose to be philosophers must not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians; we must strive to be Christian philosophers. We must therefore pursue our projects with integrity, independence, and Christian boldness (4).
So, the Christian community in a broad sense has their own motivators, purposes, ideas and goals, as do any other community whatever may be its central tenets. However, Christians should not be exclusively driven by what is important to other communities. That is not to say that these issues should be ignored but not always taken as a starting point or primary reference point. Christians must strive to be Christians in whatever they do.
Habermas and the Public Sphere
A continuing thread in Habermas’ intellectual work is the notion of the ‘public sphere.’ Habermas is thinking of intellectual principles where ideas can be debated freely and openly. My discussion will be focused on a paper from 2005 (2006 in English), ‘Religion in the Public Sphere.’
Habermas’ argument rests on his conception of the modern liberal state. For him, the liberal state is secular and so must generate its own authority apart from any divine source. This, he argues, occurs through two components:
first the equal political participation of all citizens, which guarantees that the addresses of the laws can also understand themselves as the authors of these laws; — and second the epistemic dimension of a deliberation that grounds the presumption of rationally acceptable outcomes (5).
Habermas describes two opposite understandings of how these principles might work out in practice. They are both unacceptable. On one side are the views of John Rawls and Robert Audi who argue that all reasoning in political debate needs to be entirely secular. On the other side are Nicholas Wolterstorff and Paul Weithman who argue religious citizens can justify their views entirely within their religious worldviews.
Robert Audi requires people of faith in the secular state to ‘establish a kind of “balance” between their religious and their secular convictions—in Audi’s words a theo-ethical equilibrium’ (6). This means that all religious convictions must be kept separate and only secular reasons count. I suggest that there is also a general community belief that this is exactly how religious people should behave at all times, including when they are voting. Habermas correctly observes, however, that for most believers this artificial division would be impossible. It would be ‘jeopardising their existence as pious persons’ (7). Faith is an integral part of a person’s life. Christian believers live life grounded in their faith as they understand and believe it. This is also an odd as it seems to be a requirement that only applies to Christians. Habermas notes that if
we accept this to my mind compelling objection, then the liberal state, which expressly protects such forms of life in terms of a basic right, cannot at the same time expect of all citizens that they also justify their political statements independently of their religious convictions or world views (8).
All citizens must
recognise the principle that political authority is exercised with neutrality towards competing world views (9).
I would be more explicit: whatever those world views might be. It is only politicians who need to make decision apart from their religious or any other belief system (10).
This presents a tension. The liberal state only accepts secular reasons for decisions but it is impossible for religious believers to artificially detach themselves from their own beliefs. Habermas suggests that what is required of believers is the ‘epistemic ability to consider one’s own faith reflexively from the outside and to relate it to secular views’ (11). This he terms the ‘institutional translation proviso’ (12). Believers are entitled to make decisions based on their religious convictions but to explain and justify them in language and concepts all might understand. However, where no secular translation is possible, believers should be allowed to express their convictions in religious language (13). This is a cooperative activity: both ‘sides’ need to be open to the process and that there may be truth value in each other’s views.
The Argument in a Nutshell
I have argued from Plantinga that Christians should actively engage with issues of importance to the community of believers. These debates may also be of importance to others but they need not be nor need they start from a position agreed to by any one else. The answers Christians provide need to be answers for the Christian community. Christians must not be believers only part of the time but at all times,when they are relating to others as well as thinking intellectually. Habermas argues that to ask religious believers to be anything other than people of faith is absurd as well as impossible. It is not possible for believers to artificially separate their beliefs from their intellect and neither should anyone expect them to try. When Christians discuss political issues, they are entitled to do so from that perspective and present arguments that are essentially Christian in nature. Wherever possible, Christians are expected to ‘translate’ their arguments into language that might be understood by the wider community.
Voting as a Christian
When it comes to voting, a Christian should do so as a Christian in line with how they understand their Christian beliefs. The do not need to pretend to be anything other than a Christian, nor should this be expected. They must and should give reasons for their position on a particular candidate or election issue in ways others might understand, but need not be silent if this is not possible. It is not just an obligation for Christians to do all the translation work. Anyone debating an electoral issue should expect others to think and vote in accordance with their beliefs and be open to the potential for truth in alternate arguments.
References.
(1), (2), (3), (4)
Plantinga, A. (1984). Advice to Christian Philosophers. Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 1(3): 253-271. p.271
(5)
Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-25. p.5
(6), (7), (8)
Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-25. p.8
(9), (10), (11)
Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-25. p.9
(12), (13)
Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1-25. p.5